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eral Council held in Toronto, in September, 1892. This paper which he entitled "The Protestant Reformation: its Spiritual Character and its Fruits in the Individual Life," clearly indicated the standpoint from which by preference he views the Reformation of the sixteenth century. Between the ground there taken and that of his later volume there is possibly a shade of difference. In the former he appears to regard the religious as the only correct interpretation of the great movement in question. "It is impossible," he there writes, "to state all the various ways in which men have misread the Reformation, but for the sake of showing its intrinsic spiritual character let me refer to three, which may be called the political, the intellectual, and the social." In his book, on the other hand, while retaining in great measure the phraseology of his earlier essay, he admits that other views may in themselves be correct; that, for example, the movement may be treated as an intellectual movement with Erasmus then as its central figure, and "studied but scarcely explained from this point of view." Essentially, however, there is no change; and the position is assumed, and correctly assumed, in our opinion, that "when Luther is taken as the central figure, one—the religious—must dominate all the other points of view, and the various intricate intermingled movements must be regarded as the environment of this one central impulse."

It is not necessary to say more in this connection than that Dr. Lindsay has carried out his thought consistently, forcibly and in a genuine scholarly fashion. The style is fresh and animated. The book is as remote as possible from being heavy reading. It avoids unnecessary minutiae, makes no pretense of being exhaustive, and contains few or no marginal notes. Intended for general readers, it naturally avoids any display of authorities, although it is evidently built upon a firm foundation of solid scholarship studiously hidden away from view. The interest is the greater from the fact that the author, as he tells us, has striven to show that "although Luther's life has been written scores of times there still is room for another,—for one which will be careful to set Luther in the environment of the common social life of his time." Dr. Lindsay does indeed take the pains to disclaim the pretension that his book is even a sketch of the reformer's life written in this way. But no reader, especially of the chapters treating of Luther's more intimate life, will deny him the credit of having achieved success in this direction.

HENRY M. BAIRD.

The Silver Map of the World; A Geographical Essay, including some Critical Remarks on the Zeno Narrative and Chart of 1558 and on the Curious Misconception as to the Position of the Discoveries made by Frobisher. By MILLER CHRISTY. (London: Henry Stevens, Son and Stiles. 1900. Pp. xii, 71, 10 maps.)

THE problem of geographical discovery, and of every other kind of discovery, never was and never can be the adjustment of a newly dis-

covered thing to its relation with what succeeding generations may find to be the truth. The man who finds out something about which he knew nothing, be he scientist, scholar, or merely a sailing-master, does not try to guess what those who come after him will know about it; if he is wise he will rest content with the effort to fit the new thing into its proper place in relation to what is already known. When Martin Frobisher sailed between two headlands in a part of the world where no one so far as he knew had ever been before, he did not try to construct the prospective Admiralty chart of Davis Strait. He took the best maps of the world available when he sailed from England, and, because he was a man who had done things which taught him the probable values of contemporary cartographic evidence, the additions which he made to those maps were a surprisingly close approximation to what is now known to be the actual lay of the land and water in the northwestern Atlantic. If the home-keeping students who appropriated the result of his voyages and made them a part of the general stock of European information had been content to read Frobisher's data carefully, as it was represented on the maps drawn by men who worked under his immediate influence, geographical progress would have been spared the delay of two centuries of mistaken notion regarding the coast line of southern Greenland. Mr. Miller Christy, in his essay on "The Silver Map of Drake's Voyage," shows some of the ways in which this misconception arose and what its results have been. The story is an instructive lesson for every student who feels a call to explain and elucidate the apparent errors of his predecessors.

Mr. Christy's work is in many respects one of the most suggestive of recent essays in geographical history. His subject is a silver medallion, commemorative of Drake's circumnavigation voyage of 1577-1580, which was probably designed by the same "F. G." who signed the exquisite and engraved map issued with Hakluyt's edition of Peter Martyr's *De Orbe Novo* in 1587. The medallion, which has hitherto been virtually unknown to students of cartography, shows a tracing of Drake's route, with the names of the more important places visited during the first English voyage around the world. Besides a photographic facsimile of the medallion, Mr. Christy illustrates his arguments with a number of contemporary maps, two of which have not been before available to students outside of London. One is an extremely interesting sailing chart prepared by William Borough, which appears to have been used by Frobisher in charting his discoveries during the voyage of 1576. The other is a projection, drawn by Mr. J. W. Addison, reproducing for the first time the North Atlantic configuration on the Molineux Globe in the Middle Temple, London. Aside from the maps, Mr. Christy's essay is especially useful as an illustration of the importance of considering contemporary events in their mutual relations. Francis Drake we commonly think of as a freebooter and circumnavigator; Frobisher was a searcher for the northwest passage and the gold mines thereabout; Zeno the younger was or was not a prince of impos-

tors. As Mr. Christy shows, the work of these men was intimately connected, and the significance of what each did cannot be understood without a careful appreciation of what the others were doing. Altogether, Mr. Christy has produced a thoroughly useful volume which is quite indispensable to any one who wishes to study the course of English American maritime history during the later years of the sixteenth century.

GEORGE PARKER WINSHIP.

English Political Philosophy from Hobbes to Maine. By WILLIAM GRAHAM, M.A. (New York: Henry Holt and Co. 1900. Pp. xxx, 415.)

THE problems of political philosophy belong in one aspect to philosophy, in another to jurisprudence, in another to history, and in yet another to the work of the publicist and reformer. The six authors, Hobbes, Locke, Burke, Bentham, Mill and Maine, whom Professor Graham has selected for treatment, well exemplify this variety of interests. Such a series must lend itself to quite different modes of treatment, according to the standpoint of the critic. Professor Graham, who occupies the chair of jurisprudence and political economy at Queens College, Belfast, is naturally most at home in the historical and jurisprudential rather than in the philosophical aspect of his subject, but he enters with zest into discussions of natural rights and natural law, utilitarianism and intuitionism, from an ethical as well as from a legal or political point of view.

The introduction to the work raises the question of method. Hobbes, Locke, and Bentham, it is stated, exemplify the deductive method, Maine the historical. Burke occupies a somewhat wavering position, employing the deductive method, but upon principles obtained either from experience or from history, whereas Hobbes and Locke start from an assumed state of nature and social contract. Bentham employs also the analytical method, which proceeds by analyzing and defining the leading conceptions, such as sovereignty. Mill, though advocating what he calls the inverse deductive method, which would verify historical inductions by psychological deductions, really relies chiefly on the deductive method. The author for his own part believes that the deductive method, temporarily eclipsed by Bentham's Theory of Legislation and next by the historical method, may be applied legitimately in reasoning "from our instinctive principles of justice." He holds that we may "attain to an *a priori* science of natural law or rights, and use and apply its principles deductively to new cases, as is certainly still done in courts of justice by our ablest judges." The question at once arises whether the conception of justice is not undergoing ceaseless transformation with the progress of civilization, and if so whether its ablest expositors really go back to "instinctive intuitions." In so far as there is moral progress this is found not in the instinctive aspect of our moral judgments—this instinctive